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Abstract. 
A biomass model of a wild salmon (Salmo salar) river recreational fishery is formulated, and 
the ways in which economic and biological conditions influence harvesting, stock size, 
profitability, and the benefit of the anglers are studied. The demand for recreational angling is 
met by fishing permits supplied by profit maximizing landowners. In line with today’s 
stylized management practice in Norway, it is assumed that the suppliers do not take into 
account the fact that this year’s fishing effort influences next year’s stock size. Both price-
taking and monopolistic supply is studied. These myopic schemes are contrasted with the 
social planner solution. Gear regulations in the recreational fishery, but also the commercial 
fishery, are analysed under the various management scenarios and the paper concludes with 
some policy implications. One novel result is that imposing gear restrictions in the marine 
fishery may have the opposite stock effect of imposing restrictions in the recreational fishery. 
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 “River fisheries are a natural resource of a very limited character, and would be rapidly 
exhausted, if allowed to be used by every one without restraint” 
(John Stuart Mill 1848). 
 
1. Introduction 
There has not been much good news concerning the abundance of wild salmon stocks in the 
North Atlantic during the last few decades. Stock development has been especially 
disappointing in the 1990s, due to a combination of factors, such as the sea temperature, 
diseases, and human activity, both in the spawning streams and through the strong growth of 
sea farming (NASCO 2001). Norwegian rivers are the most important spawning rivers for the 
East Atlantic stock, and about 30% of the remaining stock spawns here. The wild salmon are 
harvested by commercial and recreational fisheries. The marine harvest is mainly commercial, 
whereas the harvest in the spawning rivers is recreational. As the wild stock began to decrease 
during the 1980s, the Norwegian government imposed gear restrictions to limit the 
commercial harvest. Drift net fishing was banned in 1989 and the fishing season of bend nets 
was restricted. At the same time, the fishing season in the spawning rivers was limited. 
However, despite all of these measures taken to rebuild the stock, the abundance of salmon 
seems to be only half the level experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. The same pattern is 
observed other places (NASCO 2001). 
 
After drift net fishing was banned, catches by commercial fishermen and recreational anglers 
have been approximately equal (NOU 1999). In this paper, however, we want to focus on the 
recreational fishery, as it is more important from an economic perspective. The value of the 
marine harvest is more or less directly related to the meat value, whereas recreational 
fishermen typically pay for the right to fish, and the high willingness to pay implies that the 
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payment per kilo of actually caught fish is several times the meat value (NOU 1999). 
Altogether, there remain about 500 streams with spawning Atlantic salmon in Norway and 
sport fishing is an important recreational activity. In addition, the indirect economic effects 
from the river fishery are of great importance to many local communities (Fiske and Aas 
2001). 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how biological and economic factors affect harvest rates, 
stock growth, the economic benefit, and the distribution of economic benefits among anglers 
and landowners in a representative Norwegian salmon river. A bioeconomic biomass model is 
formulated where the demand for fishing is given in number of days, whereas the quality of 
the river, approximated by average catch per fishing day, shifts demand up. On the supply 
side, there are a fixed number of landowners, treated as a single agent, managing the fishery 
under the assumption of profit maximization. Two different management regimes are studied; 
price-taking and monopolistic behaviour. Under both these schemes, it is assumed that the 
landowners do not take into account the fact that this year’s fishing effort influences next 
year’s stock size. Management is therefore myopic. These management schemes are 
contrasted with the social planner solution. The model is illustrated by using ecological data 
from the river Imsa located on the southwestern coast of Norway (Rogaland County). 
 
There is a substantial literature on recreational fishing1. The present model essentially builds 
on the sequential harvesting model of Charles and Reed (1985), but it is also related to 
Laukkanen (2001) who analyses the northern Baltic salmon fishery. We depart from 
Laukkanen’s paper as we study the recreational river fishery in more detail, while keeping the 
                                                 
1 The demand for sport fishing has been analysed and estimated in a wide range of papers, including Anderson 
(1980b, 1983, 1993), Layman et al. (1996), Green et al. (1997), Provhencer and Bishop (1997), and Schuhmann 
(1998). Studies of recreational versus commercial fisheries include McConnell and Sutinen (1979), Bishop and 
Samples (1980), Anderson (1980a), Rosenman (1991), Sutinen (1993), Cook and McGaw (1996), and 
Laukkanen (2001). Policy measures are analysed by Anderson (1993), and Homans and Ruliffson (1999). 
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marine fishery in the background. In addition, and in contrast to Laukkanen (2001) and 
Charles and Reed (1985), the control variable in our analysis is fishing permits, not catch. 
Moreover, we differ from the traditional recreational fishing literature (but see Anderson 
1980b) in that we explicitly consider the distribution of benefits between anglers and 
landowners. Another contribution of our analysis is that we analyse gear regulations in the 
commercial and the recreational fishery under the various management scenarios. Although 
the application is for an Atlantic salmon recreational fishery, the model yields general results 
with policy relevance to other recreational fisheries in, say, Scandinavia and North-America. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, we formulate the biological 
model and introduce harvesting. The cost and benefit functions are formulated in section 
three, and today’s practice of myopic management is analysed in sections four and five based 
on price-taking and monopolistic landowners, respectively. In section six, we study the social 
planner solution, and in section seven, we present the numerical simulations. The paper 
concludes with some policy recommendations. 
 
2. Population Dynamics and Biological Equilibrium 
Building on Charles and Reed (1985), we consider a salmon sub-population whose size in 
biomass (or number of fish) at the beginning of the fishing season in year t is Xt. Both a 
marine and a river fishery influence the population during the spawning migration from its 
offshore environment to the coast and its parent river (´the home river`) where reproduction 
process takes place. A fixed fraction σ of the adult stock is assumed to leave the offshore 
habitat each year (Mills 1989) (cf. Figure 1). The marine fishery first influences the stock, 
because the marine harvest takes place in the fjords and inlets before the salmon reaches its 
spawning river. For a marine harvest rate 0 ≤ h ≤1, hσXt fish are removed from the population. 
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The escapement to the home river is accordingly (1 – h)σXt. The river fishery exploits this 
spawning population along the upstream migration. When the river harvesting fraction is 
0 ≤ yt ≤ 1, the river escapement is (1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt. This spawning stock yields a subsequent 
recruitment R((1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt) to next year’s stock. It is assumed that the stock-recruitment 
relationship R(.) is purely compensating so that R´ > 0 (more details below)2. The fraction of 
the recruits that survive is s2. When a further (quite small) proportion s1 of the spawners 
survives to be part of the stock the next year, and a proportion s0 of the nonspawners staying 
offshore similarly survives (see e.g., Mills 1989 and 2000, for details), the population 
dynamics follows as: 
 
(1) Xt+1 = s2R((1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt) + s1 (1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt + s0(1 – σ)Xt. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Generally, when a single fish population is harvested sequentially by separate fisheries, as 
here, there will be conflicts between the different groups of harvesters because the size of h 
will influence the size of yt, but the converse also applies through next year’s fisheries. Hence, 
there will be reciprocal externalities present (see, e.g., McKelvey 1997). The present analysis 
is, however, restricted to studying the exploitation of the river fishery while taking the marine 
salmon fishery as given. The main reason for doing so is that we want to analyse the sport 
fishery thoroughly, as this is by far the most important part of the salmon fishery (see above). 
However, we do examine how the marine harvest affects the harvest and benefits of the 
                                                 
2 As the juveniles usually spend several years in the river before they start their downstream migration and 
eventually join the offshore stock, the model represents a simplification of reality. This is due to the biomass 
approach, which could be made more realistic by a more detailed ecological model, including the age structure 
of the stock. Strictly speaking, therefore, each step in the time index t represents an average salmon generation 
life time (which varies between three and five years in different rivers) rather than one year. Laukkanen (2001) 
applies the same biomass approach. 
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recreational fishery, by analysing shifts in the (exogenous) marine harvesting rate. These 
shifts may be interpreted as changing restrictions imposed on the marine fishery, e.g. changes 
in season length, size and type of nets, and so forth. 
 
Given the marine harvest rate, we focus on the river offtake Yt = yt(1 – h)σXt. As discussed 
further in the next section, the market for the salmon recreational fishery is related to the 
number of daily fishing permits Dt sold throughout the season (June–August). Accordingly, 
the number of fishing permits, or the number of fishing days spent in the river, represents the 
effort in the river fishery. We assume a harvesting function of the Schaefer type: 
 
(2) Yt = qDt(1 – h)σXt, 
 
where q is the catchability coefficient, related to the type of fishing equipment (fly fishing, 
fishing lure, spinning bait, and so forth)3, and with (1 – h)σXt as the stock available for sport 
fishing (see above). When combining the catch function (2), with the river offtake Yt = 
 yt(1 – h)σXt, we find the harvesting fraction in the river simply as yt = qDt. Inserted into the 
population dynamic equation (1), the stock growth therefore yields Xt+1 =  
s2R((1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt) + s1 (1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt + s0(1 – σ)Xt. This may also be written as 
1 ( , )t t tX F X D+ = , where / 0t DF D F∂ ∂ = <  holds. In addition, we find that 0 < FX < 1 under 
the present assumption of a pure compensatory stock-recruitment function (R´ > 0). 
 
When Xt = Xt+1 = X and Dt = D, the stock-effort equilibrium is written as: 
 
(3) X = F(X,D). 
                                                 
3 The assumption of a fixed catchability coefficient has been subject to criticism. Arrenguin-Sanchez (1996) 
provides a review. 
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Implicitly, this biological equilibrium condition defines the equilibrium stock as a function of 
the number of fishing days. Differentiation yields (1 – FX)dX = FDdD. Hence, more effort 
means a smaller stock. Therefore, the stock-effort equilibrium condition is decreasing in the 
X – D diagram, and, where D = 0, it produces the highest possible stock level, whereas X = 0 
gives the highest number of fishing days incompatible with an equilibrium fishery (see Figure 
2 below). In line with intuition, it can be shown that the biological equilibrium shifts inwards 
if the marine harvest rate h shifts up. A higher catchability coefficient q shifts the biological 
equilibrium condition inwards as well. 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
3. Demand and Cost Functions 
We now introduce a market for sport fishing in our representative spawning river. On the 
demand side, there are a large number of potential recreational anglers, while there are a fixed 
number of landowners along the river who are given the right (by the State) to sell fishing 
permits (NOU 1999). These landowners are treated as a single agent, as they in most instances 
join forces and establish a river owner association. The competition from landowners in other 
rivers may vary. Crucial factors are the distance, which may vary between some few 
kilometres to over hundred kilometres, transportation costs, and various river-specific 
attributes. In most instances, the market situation is probably something between price-taking 
and monopoly behaviour (Skonhoft and Logstein 2003). However, we study both these 
market forms as stylized extremes. 
 
As already mentioned, the market for salmon recreational fishery is related to the number of 
daily fishing permits sold (see also McConnel and Sutinen 1989, Anderson 1983, 1993, and 
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Lee 1996). Fishing permits may be for one day, one week, or a whole season. However, we 
collapse all these possibilities into one-day permits only, so that fishing demand is directly 
expressed in number of day permits, Dt. The sport fishermen’s notion of the quality of the 
river is assumed to influence the demand. In line with McConnel and Sutinen (1979), this is 
expressed as the average catch per day, and for a given number of fishing days, a higher catch 
per day shifts the demand function upwards. 
 
The inverse market demand for fishing licenses is hence given as: 
 
(4) ( , )t t tP P D v= , 
 
where Pt is the fishing permit price per day and vt is the demand induced catch per day. We 
have t tv Qθ= and, where catch per day (as a quality measure) from the catch function (2) is 
seen to be proportional to the river escapement, Qt = Yt / Dt = q(1 – h)σXt . The parameter θ 
>0 indicates how catch per day translates into demand. Obviously, the quality effect will vary 
between rivers and it may change over time. For these and others reasons, it is difficult to 
assess the strength of the quality effect, but on the whole, we may interpret θ as a parameter 
measuring how important the catch is compared to other factors influencing demand4. Hence, 
in addition to PD < 0, we have Pv > 0. 
 
When inserting catch per day into the inverse demand condition (4), the current profit of the 
landowners is: 
                                                 
4 Using this simple demand function obviously means that many factors (income, average size of the fish caught, 
accommodations, congestion, and so forth) is neglected. However, our formulation seems to capture two of the 
most important demand elements. In a Norwegian survey, 92% of the sport fishermen reported that the quality of 
the river with respect to average catch per day was important. In addition, 72% reported that the price of fishing 
permits was important (Fiske and Aas, 2001). 
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(5) πt = P(Dt,θ q(1 – h)σXt)Dt – C(Dt), 
 
where C(Dt) is the cost function, covering fixed as well as variable costs with C´(Dt) > 0 and 
C´´(Dt) ≥ 0. Fixed costs include various types of costs associated with preparing the fishery 
(constructing tracks, fishing huts, and so forth), whereas variable costs include the costs of 
organizing the fishing permit sales together with enforcement. 
 
We assume that the landowners supply fishing permits based on current economic and 
biological conditions. There may be various reasons leading to myopic management, most 
important  is the insecure state of property rights due to the marine harvest. This myopic 
behaviour seems to be in accordance with the stylized facts management situation in the 
Norwegian salmon river fishery (Skonhoft and Logstein, 2003), and is the same resource 
management scheme studied in numerous papers. 
 
4. Price-Taking Landowners 
First, we look at the situation where fishing permits are supplied under price-taking 
behaviour, for example because the river is located in a fjord close to other rivers. When also 
supplying fishing permits under myopic conditions, the landowners maximize their current 
profit (5) with respect to the number of fishing permits, while taking the price as well as the 
stock as given. We then simply have the first order condition: 
 
(6) P(Dt, vt) – C´(Dt) = 0. 
 
Equation (6) defines the function ( )Pt tD D X=  (superscript ‘P’ is for price-taking behaviour). 
When inserted into the population dynamic equation (1), or Xt+1 = F(Xt,Dt), we 
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obtain 1 ( , ( ))
P
t t tX F X D X+ = . This is a first order non-linear difference equation that, in 
principle, may exhibit all types of dynamics (see the classical May 1976). Therefore, the 
present myopic management scheme does not automatically secure any long-term 
equilibrium, or steady state. However, it should be noted that there is a strong demand-side 
stabilizing effect as demand responds to the stock size through the quality factor. On the other 
hand, parameters in the stock-recruitment and harvesting functions may work in a 
destabilizing manner (more on this below). 
 
Supposing that a steady state exists, the first order condition (6) represents the economic 
equilibrium condition, where differentiation yields [PD – C´´]dD = –θq(1 – h)σ PvdX. As the 
left-hand side is negative, due to the second order condition for the maximum, we find that 
this equilibrium condition, if existing, is positively sloped in the X – D plane. Thus, in line 
with intuition, a higher stock size is associated with more fishing days in economic 
equilibrium (Figure 2 below). Therefore, the intersection with the negatively sloped biological 
equilibrium condition (2) represents the (unique) bioeconomic equilibrium ,P PX D under the 
present myopic price-taking management scheme. 
 
The total surplus of the fishery comprises the landowner profit and the angler surplus 
(consumer surplus). At a given point of time, as well as in the steady state, the angler surplus 
is given by the area under the inverse demand function for a given stock size (or the given 
demand-induced catch per day). A higher stock size for the same market price yields a higher 
angler surplus, as the inverse demand function shifts up. However, as the stock is not 
controlled by the landowners or the anglers, PX is considered to be an externality determining 
the value of the angler surplus, as well as the profit (Anderson 1983). This will also be the 
case outside the bioeconomic equilibrium. 
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Throughout the reminder of the paper, two important comparative static as well as dynamic 
effects are analysed; the effects of changes in the marine harvest rate h and the catchability 
coefficient q.  As mentioned above, a shift in the marine harvest rate may be interpreted as 
changes in the restrictions imposed on the marine fishery by the State. Likewise, a shift in the 
catchability coefficient can be related to new gear regulations in the river fishery where, say, a 
reduction in q may be due to banning of different bate types5. 
 
It can easily be shown that a higher marine harvest rate h shifts the economic equilibrium 
condition outwards, meaning that lower effort is compatible with the same fish stock. As a 
higher marine harvest rate shifts the biological equilibrium inwards (see above), we therefore 
find that the number of fishing permits decreases, whereas the equilibrium stock effect is 
generally ambiguous. If the demand response is weak, the stock will decrease with a higher 
marine harvest rate h. On the other hand, if the demand response is strong; that is, the quality 
parameter θ is high in value, we may find that the equilibrium stock increases (more on this in 
the numerical examples below). An increased catchability coefficient q (e.g. relaxed gear 
restrictions) shifts the economic equilibrium condition inwards. As the biological equilibrium 
condition shifts inwards (see above) with a higher q, we hence find that the equilibrium stock 
(if existing) decreases, while the effect on the number of fishing days is ambiguous. It can be 
shown that the sign of this effort effect depends on the demand response through θ. We 
therefore have that while relaxing the gear restrictions in the recreational fishery always 
decreases the salmon stock, relaxing the restrictions in the marine fishery may in fact increase 
the stock through reduced recreational demand (see also numerical section below). 
 
                                                 
5 Fiske and Aas (2001) present an overview of the efficiency of different angling methods in recreational salmon 
fishing. 
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The total surplus and the surplus distribution between landowners and anglers will be 
influenced by all parameter changes. The outcomes are generally quite complex because of 
the quality effect in the demand function. If a higher marine harvest fraction h is accompanied 
by a smaller stock, together with a lower number of fishing permits, the angler surplus 
decreases. This may also be the case for the landowner profit (but not with constant marginal 
cost, see below). However, which of these components that is reduced most, depends on 
circumstances. The picture is even more complex if a higher h is accompanied by more 
salmon (more on this in the numerical analysis). 
 
5. Monopolistic Landowners 
We now turn to the other stylised management scheme where the landowners may act as 
monopolistic suppliers of fishing permits, for example because the river is located far away 
from other rivers. Under monopolistic and myopic behaviour, maximizing (5) with respect to 
Dt yields the first order condition: 
 
(7) P(Dt, vt) + PD( Dt, vt)D – C´(Dt) = 0. 
 
Equation (7) defines the function ( )Mt tD D X=  (superscript ‘M’ is for monopolistic 
behaviour). Inserted into the population growth function (1), or 1 ( , )t t tX F X D+ = , yields a 
first order non-linear difference equation, as before. It is difficult to say how this difference 
equation behaves in comparison with the price-taker situation. However, as this management 
scheme is more conducive to the conservation of stock (see below), one suspects that 
fluctuations, if any, will decline. We come back to this issue in the numerical simulations. 
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Supposing that a steady state exists, the first order condition (7) yields the economic 
equilibrium condition under the monopolistic supply assumption, MX and MD . 
Differentiation gives [ ] [ ]2 (1 )D DD v DvP DP C dD q h P DP dX′′+ − = −θ − σ + , where the term in the 
bracket on the left-hand side is negative again, due to the second order condition. Under the 
reasonable assumption that the quality effect dominates the potentially negative cross effect in 
the demand function, so that [ ] 0v DvP DP+ > , we find that the economic equilibrium condition 
again is positively sloped in the X–D diagram. However, it is less positively sloped than the 
economic equilibrium condition under price-taking behaviour. Notice also that the 
interceptions of the first order conditions (6) and (7) with the X  axis are the same (again, see 
Figure 2). For these reasons, as expected, the bioeconomic equilibrium stock is higher and the 
number of supplied permits is lower than under price-taking behaviour; that is, M PX X> and 
M PD D< . 
 
While the price-taking scheme yields more fish and less effort in bioeconomic equilibrium 
than the monopolistic scheme, the total surplus will not necessarily be higher. The reason is 
that the quality effect in the demand function works like an externality (see also above). 
Hence, higher profit may dominate a reduced angler surplus when moving from the myopic 
price-taking scheme to the myopic monopolistic scheme (cf. the numerical results). 
Depending on how the demand curve shifts, it is possible, at least in theory, that the angler 
surplus can increase when moving to the monopolistic scheme. 
 
6. The Social Planner Solution 
The above myopic management regimes are now contrasted with the social planner solution, 
where the goal is to maximize the present value overall economic benefit, comprising the 
profit of the landowners as well as the angler surplus (consumer surplus), while taking the 
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population dynamics into account. Hence, the goal of the social planner is to maximize 
1
0
[ ( , ) ( )] ( ) /
T
t T
t t t t T
t
P D v D C D J Xρ ρ δ−
=
− +∑  without taking the downward-sloping demand 
schedule into account. T is the planning period, and ρ = 1/(1+δ) is the discount factor, with 
δ > 0 as the (yearly) discount rate, whereas J(XT) = [P(DT,vT)DT – C(DT)] is the scrap-value 
function. Therefore, it is assumed that the resulting stock XT can be sustainably harvested 
forever. 
 
To fit this optimization problem to the standard discrete-time optimal control format, the 
population dynamics is rewritten as 1 ( , )t t t t tX X F X D X+ − = − . The current value Hamiltonian 
of this problem then reads (see, e.g., Conrad and Clark 1995) as 
1 1( , , ) [ ( , ) ( )] [ ( , ) ]t t t t t t t t t t tH X D P D v D C D F X D Xλ ρλ+ += − + − , where 0tλ >  is the resource 
shadow price. The first order conditions yield: 
 
(8) 1( , ) ( ) ( , ) 0t t t t D t tP D v C D F X Dρλ +′− + =  ; t = 0,...,T–1 , 
 
and 
 
(9) 1 1( , ) (1 ) [ ( , ) 1]t t v t t t t X t tP D v q h D F X Dρλ λ θ σ ρλ+ +− = − − − − ; t = 1,...,T–1, 
 
when assuming an interior solution (a positive supply of fishing permits at the steady state). In 
addition, we have the transversality condition '( ) /T TJ Xλ δ= . 
 
The interpretation of control condition (8) is that fishing permits should be supplied up to the 
point where the licence price is equal to the marginal cost of the suppliers plus the cost of 
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reduced stock growth, evaluated at the shadow price. Equation (9) is the portfolio condition 
governing the change of the resource price. Basically, it states that the biomass should be 
maintained so that the change in the net natural growth is equal to the (shadow) price change, 
adjusted for the discount factor. As the Hamiltonian is not linear in the control, we typically 
find that the dynamics will not be characterized by a Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) but 
will be close to this type (see the numerical analysis). 
 
Suppose that a steady state exists and is reachable from 0X . Evaluating (8) at the steady state 
implies [ ( , ) ( )] / ( , )t DP D v C D F X Dλ ρ′= − − . Substituting (8) into (9), also in the steady state, 
and rearranging, we obtain the discrete time golden rule condition: 
 
(10) [ ]( )
( , ) (1 )
( , ) ( , ) 1
( , )
v
X D
P D Q q h D
F X D F X D
P D Q C D
θ θ σ δθ
−− = +′− , 
 
which states that the internal rate of return of the resource should be equal to the external rate 
of return (1 +δ ). Therefore, the golden rule condition, together with the biological 
equilibrium condition (3), yields the social planner steady state *X and *D . 
 
The steady state of the social planner solution may be compared to the steady states (if 
existing) under myopic management. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the control 
condition (8) in economic equilibrium will be located further outward than equation (6) in 
equilibrium, because ' 0DF < and 0λ > (again, see Figure 2). Therefore, we can conclude that 
the steady-state stock level will be higher and the number of fishing permits will be lower 
than under the myopic price-taking scheme; that is, * PX X> and * PD D< . Consequently, the 
fishing permit price following myopic price-taking management will always be below the 
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social planner solution. Comparing with the monopolistic myopic solution (7) indicates that 
the social planner solution, depending on the difference ( )D DP D F−ρλ , will be located 
between the price-taking solution and the monopolistic solution. Notice that the interception 
with the X  axis will be the same as in the myopic regimes because the shadow price of the 
stock is zero whenever there is no permit sale. 
 
However, it is not possible to infer anything definite about the distribution of benefits between 
the anglers and landowners. The total current surplus in the myopic equilibria may be higher 
than the social planner solution due to discounting6. It can be shown that a higher periodic 
discount rate will increase the slope of the control condition (8) in equilibrium. Consequently, 
as expected, the steady state of the social planner solution approaches the price-taking myopic 
management solution. In the limiting case with δ = ∞ , we find that the social planner solution 
coincides with the equilibrium price-taker myopic management situation. The steady-state 
total surplus and the distribution of the surplus are then equal in these regimes. When 0δ = , 
the steady state of the planner solution coincides with the problem of maximizing the total 
current surplus in biological equilibrium while taking into account this equilibrium7. Then, the 
total current surplus in equilibrium is obviously higher in the social planner solution than in 
the myopic price-taking situation. However, for intermediate values of the discount rate the 
opposite can hold. This will also be the case when comparing the social planner solution with 
the myopic monopolistic scheme. 
 
7. Numerical Analysis and Results 
                                                 
6 However, the present-value total surplus is obviously higher under the social planner solution than the present-
value total surplus of the myopic solutions for the same time period and discount rate.  
7 These results are the same as we find in the standard Clark harvesting model (see, e.g., Munro and Scott 1985). 
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7.1. Data and specific functional forms 
The above analysis will now be illustrated numerically with data from the river Imsa. This is a 
typically small, but productive, salmon river located on the southwestern coast of Norway (for 
details, see Hansen et al. 1996). We start by specifying the functional forms. The stock-
recruitment function is given as the Cushing curve version of the Shepherd function 
(Shepherd, 1982, King, 1995): 
 
(11) (1 )(1 )((1 )(1 ) )
(1 )(1 )1
t t
t t
t t
qD h XR R qD h X r
qD h X
K
γ
σσ σ
− −= − − = − −⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
 
where (1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt is the spawning biomass (see section 2 above), r > 0 is the intrinsic 
growth rate interpreted as the maximum number of recruits per spawning salmon, and 0K >  
is the stock level for which density dependent mortality equals density independent mortality. 
Finally, the compensation parameter 0γ >  indicates to what extent density independent 
effects compensate for changes in the stock size. The parameter values are estimated by 
Hansen et al. (1996) for Imsa and are reported in the Appendix. Here, it can be seen that we 
have γ < 1 and the density-dependent effect is weak. Consequently, as already indicated, the 
stock-recruitment function (11) is increasing for all levels of the spawning population, R’ > 0. 
 
The inverse demand function is specified as linear. In addition, it is assumed that the quality 
of the river, approximated by catch per day, Q = q(1 – h)σXt, shifts the demand uniformly up: 
 
(12) Pt = αθq(1 – h)σXt –  βDt. 
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Accordingly, the choke price α gives the maximum willingness to pay when the quality-
translated catch is one fish per day, whereas β reflects the price response in a standard 
manner. The cost function is given linear as well: 
 
(13) Ct = c0 + cDt , 
 
so that c0 is the fixed cost, while c is the constant marginal cost of providing a fishing permit 
(see also section 3 above). Based on the above demand and cost functions, we find that the 
first order condition under the myopic price taking and monopolistic scheme are αθq(1 –
 h)σXt –  βDt = c and αθq(1 – h)σXt –  2βDt = c, respectively. It is therefore a linear, 
increasing relationship between stock size and the number of fishing days, and the slope of 
the economic equilibrium condition under price taking will be two times higher than that of 
the monopolistic case (cf. also Figure 2). The economic parameter values are found in the 
Appendix as well. 
 
7.2. Steady state 
First, we look at the steady states. For the baseline parameter values, the steady state will be 
approached smoothly under all three management schemes. It can be seen in Table I that the 
monopolistic myopic regime is somewhat more stock conserving than the social planner 
solution. As demonstrated above, the reason for this is that, in order to increase profit, the 
monopolist reduces demand more than does the social planner, who accounts for the future 
stock value. When the landowners face competition and act as price takers, the stock is 
substantially lower. On the contrary, and consistent with this, permit sales are higher and the 
license price is lower. Because of the constant marginal cost assumption, the price under the 
price-taking scheme just equalizes this value. 
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Table I about here 
 
In addition, under the baseline parameter values, it can be seen that the total surplus (angler 
and landowner surplus) in the social planner solution and the monopolistic case are equal. 
This happens by accident, but as noted above it is possible that the steady-state total surplus in 
the myopic monopolistic case (as well as under price taking) can exceed the social planner 
solution due to discounting (section 6 above). The total surplus in the myopic monopolistic 
case is above that of the myopic price-taking case. As explained in section 5, the reason for 
this is the quality shift in the market demand function. However, the anglers are substantially 
better off under the myopic price-taking scheme irrespective of the fact that the quality of the 
fishing experience, measured as catch per day, is lowest here. Thus, the low fishing license 
price more than compensates for the low quality. Note also that the angler surplus is higher 
under the price-taking regime than under social planner solution as well. 
 
Table I reports the results when the catchability coefficient increases by 20% due to relaxed 
gear restrictions. The stock abundance becomes substantially lower under the price-taking 
scheme while the stock effects are more modest in the monopolistic case and social planner 
case due to the increased fishing permit price. The catchability shift materializes into small 
changes in the angler surplus, while the landowner surplus increases most under the social 
planner solution. Moreover, since the total surplus increases with more efficient fishing 
equipment the opposite occurs when gear restrictions are imposed.  
 
Table II demonstrates how changes in the marine harvest rate h affect the steady-state river 
fishery, where 0.4h = is the baseline value (cf. also Table I). A higher marine harvest rate 
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through relaxed harvesting restrictions has an ambiguous stock effect under both myopic 
schemes, whereas the stock decreases under the social planner solution. If the quality demand 
effect is strong, we hence obtain the somewhat paradoxical result that a higher marine 
harvesting pressure goes hand in hand with more fish (section 4 above). Note that this is the 
exact opposite stock effect of that obtained by relaxing the gear restrictions in the recreational 
fishery under the myopic schemes (see discussion above). Under the social planner solution, 
on the other hand, a higher h translates consistently into a smaller stock because the stock 
shadow price, from a river management point of view, depends on the fish biomass entering 
the river. Hence, when the marine harvest rate increases, the shadow price decreases. A higher 
h generally reduces the surplus. 
 
Table II about here 
 
7.3. Dynamics 
For the given specific functional forms, the first order myopic profit maximum conditions 
yield linear relationships between the number of fishing days and the stock. We 
have ( ) (1/ )[ (1 ) ]Pt t tD D X q h X cβ αθ σ= = − −  in the price-taking case and 
( ) (1/ 2 )[ (1 ) ]Mt t tD D X q h X cβ αθ σ= = − −  in the monopolistic case (cf. sections 4, 5, and 
7.1). Therefore, these equations, combined with the population growth function (1), or 
1 ( , )t t tX F X D+ = , and the stock-recruitment function (11), yield the first order non-linear 
difference stock equations under the myopic schemes to be studied here. 
 
Figures 3a and 3b demonstrate the dynamics for the baseline parameterization of these 
myopic schemes. In contrast, Figure 3c shows the social planner solution where the planning 
horizon is infinite (see Appendix). The initial stock size is assumed to be quite modest 
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( 0 50X = ), so these transitional growth paths demonstrate recovery from a previous situation 
involving serious overfishing. The steady states are reached rapidly, with negligible 
overshooting, and the dynamics are quite similar under all three management scenarios. The 
social planner solution seems to be close to MRAP (see section 6 above). As mentioned, the 
basic stabilizing factor is the quality factor in demand; that is, a low stock is accompanied by 
a modest demand and the stock rebuilds smoothly. Starting with other initial values gives 
more or less the same picture, leading to the unique steady states. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Although the steady states under myopic management seem to be quite stable given the 
baseline parameter values, other ecological and economic conditions may produce instability. 
We find that relaxing the gear restrictions and thereby increasing the recreational fishery 
catchability coefficient q may induce all types of dynamics. For example, the dynamics will 
exhibit a two-point cycle pattern (see, e.g., Conrad and Clark 1987) if q increases by 35 % 
(see Figure 4). Such a shift will not produce cycles in the monopolistic case but rather result 
in an initial overshooting (not shown). 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
We have also studied the dynamics when the marine harvesting pressure changes. Under 
myopic price-taking behaviour by landowners, it turns out that lower marine harvest activity 
may produce instability. If gear restrictions reduce the marine harvest pressure from the 
baseline level of 0.4 to 0.2, the stock exhibits damped oscillations (Figure 4). If h  shifts 
further down to just 0.1, the dynamics will be of the two-point cycle type. An even further 
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reduction down to zero, interpreted as a marine harvesting ban, leads to a chaotic pattern. 
Thus, the initial value of the stock is crucial for the dynamics. The reason why low marine 
harvest rates work in the direction of instability is that, as the marine harvest rate decreases, 
more salmon enter the river and produce an upward shift in the market demand function 
through the quality effect. Hence, at least in the initial stage, the effect is an upward shift in 
demand due to an increased willingness to pay.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines two myopic management regimes in a recreational river fishery and 
contrasts these with the social planner solution. The management schemes are evaluated in 
terms of profitability, angler surplus, effort use, license price, and stock size. The marine 
harvesting activity is given throughout the analysis. Both the steady states and dynamic paths 
are examined. It is generally unclear how the various harvesting schemes distribute total 
surplus between anglers and landowners. This hinges critically on the uncertain stock and 
effort effects under the different management scenarios.  
 
It has traditionally been argued that the recreational fishery is of minor importance to the wild 
Atlantic salmon stock abundance because the escapement needed to ensure recruitment is 
quite low (see introduction). Thus, NASCO (2001) regards low marine survival as the crucial 
factor determining the decreasing wild stock. We offer an alternative explanation as we have 
shown that, even with a constant marine survival, large stock fluctuations may be due to type 
of river management. Moreover, we demonstrate that an increased marine harvesting activity 
may in fact be stock conserving under myopic management. 
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The analysis indicates some policy and regulation implications. First, measures taken to 
reduce the marine harvesting activity may produce unclear stock effects as well as large stock 
fluctuations. The crucial factor here is how strong the demand quality effect is. As seen, this 
hinges critically on type of management scheme in the river, and in the myopic case we find 
that a reduced marine harvest rate may go hand in hand with a reduced stock. Imposing gear 
restrictions in the river generally increases the stock and decreases total surplus, but may also 
lead to reduced stock fluctuations over time. Thus, imposing gear restrictions in the marine 
fishery may have the exact opposite stock effects of imposing restrictions in the recreational 
fishery. The dynamic properties may also be of the opposite. One additional straightforward 
measure to reduce fluctuations under price-taking myopic management is to impose a tax 
equal to the shadow price of the stock. This would ensure stock and effort levels equivalent to 
those under the social planner solution. 
 
References 
Anderson, L.G. (1980a), ‘An Economic Analysis of Joint Recreational and Commercial 
Fisheries’, in J. H. Grover, ed., Allocation of fishery resources, proceedings of the technical 
consultations, Vichy, France, 1980, FAO, Rome, 16-26. 
 
Anderson, L.G. (1980b), ‘Estimating the Benefits of Recreation under Conditions of 
Congestion: Comments and Extension’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 7, 401-406.  
 
Anderson, L.G. (1983), ‘The Demand Curve for Recreational Fishing with an Application to 
Stock Enhancement Activities’, Land Economics 59(3), 279-287. 
 
Anderson, L.G. (1993), ‘Toward a Complete Economic Theory of the Utilization and 
Management of Recreational Fisheries’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 24, 272-295. 
 
Arrenguín-Sánchez, F. (1996), ‘Catchability: A Key Parameter for Fish Stock Assessment’, 
Rewievs in Fish Biology and Fisheries  6, 221-242. 
 
Bishop, R.C., and K.C. Samples (1980), ‘Sport and Commercial Fishing Conflicts. A 
Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 7, 220-233. 
 
 24
Charles, C., and W. J. Reed (1985), ‘A Bioeconomic Analysis of Sequential Fisheries: 
Competition, Coexistence, and Optimal Harvest Allocation Between Inshore and Offshore 
Fleets’, Canadian J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 42, 952-962. 
 
Clark, C. (1990): Mathematical Bioeconomics, New York: John Wiley.  
 
Conrad, J.M. and C.W. Clark (1995), Natural Resource Economics. Notes and Problems, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cook, B. A., and R.L. McGaw (1996), ‘Sport and Commercial Fishing Allocations for the 
Atlantic Salmon Fisheries of the Miramichi River’, Canadian J. of Agricultural Economics 
44, 165-171. 
 
Fiske, P., and Ø. Aas, ed. (2001), Laksefiskeboka. Om Sammenhenger mellom Beskatning, 
Fiske og Verdiskaping ved Elvefiske etter Laks, Sjøaure og Sjørøye,  NINA Temahefte 20, 1-
100.  
 
Green, G., C.B. Moss, and T. Spreen (1997), ‘Demand for Recreational Fishing in Tampa 
Bay, Florida: A Random Utility Approach’, Marine Resource Economics 12, 293-305. 
King, M. (1995), Fisheries Biology, Assessment and Management, Fishing news books, 
Blackwell Science Ltd.   
 
Hansen, L.P., B. Jonsson, and N. Jonsson (1996), ‘Overvåkning av Laks fra Imsa og 
Drammenselva’, NINA oppdragsmelding 401, 1-28. 
 
Homans, F.R., and J.A. Ruliffson (1999), ‘The Effects of Minimum Ssize Limits on 
Recreational Fishing’, Marine Resource Economics 14(1), 1-14. 
 
Laukkanen, M. (2001), ‘A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Northern Baltic Salmon Fishery: 
Coexistence versus Exclusion of Competing Sequential Fisheries’, Environmental and 
Resource Economics 18: 293-315. 
 
Layman, R.C., J.R., Boyce, K.R., Criddle (1996), ‘Economic Valuation of the Chinook 
Salmon Sport Fishery of the Gulkana River, Alaska, under Current and Alternative 
Management Plans’, Land Economics 72(1), 113-128 
 
Lee, S-T. (1996), The Economics of Recreational Fishing, University of Washington, 
Dissertation. 
 
May, R.M. (1976), ‘Simple Mathematical Models with Very Complicated Dynamics’, Nature 
261, 459-467. 
 
McConnell, K.E., and J.G. Sutinen (1979), ‘Bioeconomic Models of Marine Recreational 
Fishing’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 6, 127-139. 
 
McKelvey, R. (1997), ‘Game-theoretic Insights into the International Management of 
Fisheries’, Natural Resource Modeling 10(2), 129-171. 
 
Mills, D. (1989), Ecology and Management of Atlantic Salmon, New York: Chapman and 
Hall.  
 25
 
Mills, D. (2000), The Ocean Life of Atlantic Salmon. Environmental and Biological Factors 
Influencing Survival. Fishing News Books, New York: Chapman and Hall. 
 
Munro, G., and A. Scott. (1985). ‘The economics of fishery management’, in A.V. Kneese 
and J. L. Sweeney, eds., Handbook of natural resource and energy economics, vol. II, 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
 
NASCO (2001), ‘Report on the Activities of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organization 2000-2001’, Retrieved from http://www.nasco.int/ on 10 December 2003.  
 
NOU (1999), Til Laks åt Alle Kan Ingen Gjera? NOU 1999:9. 
 
Rosenman, R. (1991), ‘Impacts of Recreational Fishing on the Commercial Sector: An 
Empirical Analysis of Atlantic Mackerel’, Natural Resource Modeling 5(2), 239-257.  
 
Provhencer, B. and R.C. Bishop (1997), ‘An Estimable Dynamic Model of Recreational 
Behaviour with an Application to Great Lakes Angling’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 33, 107-127.   
 
Schuhmann, P.W. (1998), ‘Modeling Dynamics of Fishery Harvest Reallocations: An 
Analysis of the North Carolina Red Drum Fishery’, Natural Resource Modeling 11(3), 241-
271. 
 
Shepherd, J.G. (1982), ‘A Versatile New Stock-recruitment Relationship for Fisheries, and 
the Construction of Sustainable Yield Curves’, Journal du Conseil, Conseil Internationale 
pour L`Exploration de la Mer, 40(1), 67-75.  
 
Skonhoft, A. and R. Logstein (2003), ‘Sportsfiske etter Laks. En Bioøkonomisk Analyse’, 
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift 117(1), 31-51. 
Sutinen, J.G. (1993), ‘Recreational and Commercial Fisheries Allocation with Costly 
Enforcement’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75, 1183-1187. 
 26
 Appendix  
The ecological parameter values are based on Hansen et al. (1996) (see also Skonhoft and Logstein, 
2003), whereas some of the key economic parameter values are calibrated to ensure the resulting 
prices and catches are realistic.  The (fixed) marginal cost of the landowners, which is given as 
50c = NOK per day, is crucial here, as is the quality response in demand, which is fixed at 1θ = . 
The steady-state fishing licence price under myopic price-taking management then becomes 50 NOK 
per day, whereas catch per fishing day is 0.72 (salmon per day) under the baseline scenario. These and 
other values fit reasonably well with a small salmon river fishery according to NOU (1999) and Fiske 
and Aas (2001). 
 
Figure AI about here 
 
The marine harvest rate varies considerably over time, but has declined significantly during the last 
few years (see section one in the main text, NOU 1999). We use 0.4 as the baseline value. The myopic 
scheme then yields approximately the same river catch (in number of salmon) as the marine catch, 
which again fits reasonably well with a small river fishery. The planning period under social planning 
is set at T = ∞ in the simulations.  
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Figure 1. Harvest and growth 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic and biological equilibrium, myopic management, price taking (P) and 
monopolistic (M) landowners, and under the social planner solution (*).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
X 
  DP 
 
 D* 
   
 DM 
        XP      X*   XM
Biological equilibrium (Eq. 3)               
                                    
                                   Price-taker’s economic equilibrium  
                                    condition (Eq. 6) 
Monopolist’s  
economic 
equilibrium 
condition (Eq. 7) 
Social planner’s 
economic equilibrium 
condition (Eq. 8)
Xt 
 
σXt 
Non-spawners 
Spawners 
Inshore 
fishery 
hσXt 
(1-σ)Xt 
Marine  
off take 
Survival 
s0(1-σ)Xt 
Stream 
fishery 
Survival 
 
s2R((1-yt)(1-h)σXt) 
(1-h)σXt 
yt(1-h)σXt 
Recreational 
off take 
(1-yt)(1-h)σXt 
Reproduction
s1(1-yt)(1-h)σXt 
Xt+1 
Recruitement
 28
Myopic price taking management
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Year
Ef
fo
rt,
 st
oc
k 
si
ze
 
Myopic monopolistic management
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Year
 
                                   a)                                                        b) 
 
Social planner management
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Year
Effort (Dt)
Stock size (Xt)
 
                            c) 
Figure 3: Dynamic  paths. Baseline parameter values. Stock size tX  (number of salmon), effort in 
number of fishing days tD . Myopic price taking scheme (a), Myopic monopolistic scheme (b), Social 
planner solution (c)    
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Figure 4. Dynamic paths myopic price taking. Stock size tX  (number of salmon), effort in number of 
fishing days tD . The catchability coefficient q increased by 35% (a)  The marine harvest rate, h , 
decreased from 0.4 to 0.2 (b). 
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Table I. Steady state. Stock size X (number of salmon), number of fishing days D, permit price P 
(NOK per day), landowner surplus LS (1000 NOK), angler surplus AS (1000 NOK) and total surplus 
TS (1000 NOK). 
  
Parameter values 
Myopic  
Price taker 
Myopic 
Monopolist 
Social planner 
management 
             
         X 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
562 
 469  
692  
623  
665  
 628  
 
D 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
237 
237 
152 
166 
171 
163 
 
P 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
50 
50 
201 
216 
168 
221 
 
LS 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
0 
0 
23 
27 
20 
28 
 
AS 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
28 
28 
12 
14 
15 
13 
 
TS 
Baseline values 
Catchability ↑ 
28 
28 
35 
41 
35 
41 
Table note: Catchability ↑; the catchability coefficient q  increases 20%.  
 
 
 
Table II. Steady state. Different marine harvest rates. Stock size X (number of salmon), number of 
fishing days D, permit price P (NOK per day), landowner surplus LS (1000 NOK), angler surplus AS 
(1000 NOK) and total surplus TS (1000 NOK). 
 Marine harvest rate h 
 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Myopic price taking management 
XP 453 512 562 573 482 
DP 335 298 237 145 32 
PP 50 50 50 50 50 
LSP 0 0 0 0 0 
ASP 56 44 28 10 1 
TSP 56 44 28 10 1 
Myopic monopolistic management 
XM 671 696 692 638 495 
DM 260 212 151 83 17 
PM 310 261 202 134 67 
LSM 68 45 23 7 0 
ASM 34 22 11 3 0 
TSM 102 67 34 10 0 
Social planner solution 
X* 765 715 665 604 486 
D* 219 202 171 116 29 
P* 431 284 168 89 54 
LS* 83 47 20 5 1 
AS* 24 20 15 7 0 
TS* 107 67 35 12 1 
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Table AI. Baseline values prices and costs, ecological parameters and other parameters 
Parameter Parameter description Value 
r -Maximum recruitment per spawning salmon 124 (smolt per 
spawning salmon) 
K -Stock level where density dependent mortality dominates 
density independent factors 
5.3 (number of 
spawning salmon) 
γ -Degree to which extent density-independent effects compensate 
for stock changes. 
0.77 
σ -Fraction of non-spawners 0.85 
s0 -Survival rate non-spawners 0.5 
s1 -Share of salmon spawning twice 0.25 
s2 -Survival rate, downstream smolt migration 0.4 
α -Reservation price when catch per day is 1 400 (NOK/salmon) 
β -Price effect demand 1 (NOK/day2) 
c -Marginal cost fishing permit sale 50 (NOK/day) 
c0 -Fixed cost fishing permit sale 0 
q -Catchability coefficient 0.0025 (1/day) 
h -Marine harvest rate 0.4 
δ -Period discount rate 0.07 
θ -Quality response in demand 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
